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Income Taxation in Washington: In a Class by
Itself
J. Thomas Carrato* & Richard W. Hemstad**
Over the past half-century the desirability of a state net
income tax has dominated public tax policy debate in the State
of Washington. Severely constrained by our supreme court's re-
strictive interpretations of amendment 14 to the state constitu-
tion, the legislature has been unable to fashion a coherent tax
policy for the state. As a result, we today have an extraordinarily
regressive tax system' that does not effectively meet basic needs2
and simultaneously reinforces public skepticism concerning the
effectiveness and responsiveness of our institutions of govern-
ment.
While there can be extended debate regarding the desirabil-
ity of a net income tax and its form, 3 there is general agreement
that such a tax would result in a state tax structure substantially
less regressive, would provide greater elasticity in revenue
* B.S., 1970, Stanford University; J.D., 1978, University of Puget Sound.
** Professor of Law, University of Puget Sound; B.A., 1955, St. Olaf College; J.D.,
1958, University at Chicago; member, Washington Bar.
1. The pronounced regressivity of Washington's tax system may be illustrated by
comparing the state-local tax burden as a percentage of the adjusted gross income of a
Washington family of four with its counterparts in the neighboring states of Oregon and
Idaho:*
Adjusted Gross Income
$5,000 $7,500 $10,000 $17,500 $25,000 $50,000
Wash. 10.4 8.3 6.8 5.8 4.7 3.5
Ore. 6.6 8.3 8.4 9.0 9.4 10.6
Idaho 9.7 8.3 7.8 8.3 8.6 9.0
*1974 figures
Washington's tax system appears to be more regressive than that of any other state. See
ADVISORY COMM'N INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, SIGNIFICANT FEATURES OF FISCAL
FEDERALISM, Vol. II REVENUE AND DEBT 45 (1977). One study flatly states: "Oregon's tax
system is the most progressive whereas Washington's is the most regressive." E. LIaE,
FAMILY TAX BURDENS CoMPARED AMONG STATES AND AMONG CITIES LOCATED WITHIN KEN-
TUCKY AND NEIGHBORING STATES 23 (1975).
2. The Washington Supreme Court is currently considering the appeal of a superior
court decision holding the state in violation of article IX, section 1, of the Washington
State Constitution which provides: "It is the paramount duty of the state to make ample
provision for the education of all children residing within its borders .... " Seattle School
Dist. v. State, No. 53950 (Thurston County Super. Ct., Jan. 14, 1977).
3. See, e.g., W. BLUM & H. KALVEN, THE UNEASY CASE FOR PROGRESSIVE TAXATION
(1953).
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growth, and would lessen the distorting effect our heavy reliance
on excise taxes has on economic decisions.'
Rather surprisingly, the state constitution does not explicitly
deny the legislature power to tax net income. The prohibition is
the result of a series of Washington Supreme Court decisions
severely restricting the legislative authority to define classifica-
tions of property for taxation. The purposes of this article are to
demonstrate that the Washington Supreme Court interpretations
of the relevant constitutional provisions are erroneous, and to
present our views of a proper analysis of the legislature's power
to classify for purposes of taxation.
I. THE ISSUE
In a series of decisions beginning with the 1933 landmark
Culliton v. Chase,5 the Washington Supreme Court thwarted
popular and legislative attempts to levy a net income tax. In the
process, and to achieve that result, the court' molded its interpre-
tation of thLJe "uniformity clause" of amendmn 4t h osi
tution: "All taxes shall be uniform upon the same class of prop-
erty within the territorial limits of the authority levying the tax
. ... "'I Amendment 14, adopted in 1930, dramatically changed
the original constitutional article governing taxation. Three years
after its adoption, however, the court decided Culliton and trans-
formed the uniformity clause into a virtual prohibition against
legislative classification of property for tax purposes, thereby, as
will be seen, emasculating one of the major purposes of amend-
ment 14.
Although the court's improper interpretation of the uniform-
ity clause is generally applicable to all property taxation, the
court established and embellished its uniformity criteria only in
cases invalidating net income taxes. And though property is
taxed despite the court's restrictive interpretations of the uni-
formity clause, net income is still not taxed in this state because
of those restrictions. While the court was developing its strict
4. TAx ADVISORY COUNCIL OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON, PROPOSALS FOR CHANGES IN
WASHINGTON'S TAX STRucruRE, SEcoND REPORT 21 (1968); ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOV-
ERNmENTAL RELATIONS, SINIFMANr FEATuEEs OF FIscAL FEDERA.,SM 1-4 (1974).
5. 174 Wash. 363, 25 P.2d 81 (1933).
6. Unless otherwise noted:
a. "court" refers to the Washington Supreme Court;
b. "amendment 14" refers to amendment 14 of the Washington Constitution; and
c. any reference to equal protection refers to the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment to the United States Constitution.
7. WASH. CONST. amend. 14.
[Vol. 1:255
Income Taxation in Washington
limitations on legislative discretion to classify for property taxes
under the uniformity clause, other taxes, characterized as excise
taxes, it analyzed quite differently. Classifications made for
excise taxes were subjected to the more permissive standards of
the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution and
its practical equivalent, the privileges and immunities clause of
the state constitution.8 Thus, the court singled out income taxa-
tion for uniquely severe constitutional restrictions.
The reasoning in Culliton and its progeny was syllogistic: (1)
income is property and a tax on income is a tax on property; (2)
taxes on property must be uniform; and (3) a net income tax is
not uniform The first premise in this reasoning has drawn the
most criticism 0 and concern." Those disputing the supreme
court's decisions or attempting to avoid them have attacked the
notion that income is property, arguing instead that an income
tax is an excise tax. This approach, however, must overcome the
definition of "property" in the Washington Constitution which
provides: "The word 'property' as used herein shall mean and
include everything, whether tangible or intangible, subject to
ownership.' 2 This definition is as comprehensive as could be
devised, is sui generis among state constitutions, and has con-
sistently been judicially construed to include "income.' 3
In this article we do not attack the first premise of the
8. The state privileges and immunities clause provides: "No law shall be passed
granting to any citizen, class of citizens, or corporation other than municipal, privileges
or immunities which upon the same terms shall not belong equally to all citizens or
corporations." WASH. CONST. art. 1, § 12. The Washington Supreme Court regards this
clause as "substantially identical" to the equal protection clause in the Federal Constitu-
tion. Texas Co. v. Cohn, 8 Wash. 2d 360, 374, 112 P.2d 522, 529 (1941).
9. Justice Blake's persuasive Culliton dissent characterizes the majority's argument
as a syllogism. His dissent is the starting point for our efforts to extract the issue of
legislative classification from the morass of uniformity doctrine, and to clarify the classifi-
cation analysis:
The syllogism seems perfect, but, as I see it, there are two answers to it: (1)
That, notwithstanding the definition of property contained in the amendment,
the exaction imposed under the income tax law is an excise and not a property
tax; (2) that, if it is a property tax, the classifications fixed by the act are within
the constitutional limitations of the fourteenth amendment.
174 Wash. at 389, 25 P.2d at 87 (emphasis in original).
10. See Harsch, State Income Taxation as Affected by Property Tax Limitations, 6
WASH. L. REV. 97 (1931); O'Conner & Schillberg, A Study of State Income Taxation in
Washington, 33 WASH. L. REv. 398 (1958); Note, Constitutionality of State Income Taxes,
8 WASH. L. REV. 81 (1933); Recent Cases, 11 WASH. L. REV. 172 (1936).
11. See Harsch & Shipman, The Constitutional Aspects of Washington's Fiscal
Crisis, 33 WASH. L. REv. 225 (1958).
12. WASH. CONST. amend. 14.
13. See discussion at Part IV infra.
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Culliton rationale. We simply accept the proposition that income
is property, and examine the court's holdings to that effect only
to discern and explain the relationship of that step to the remain-
ing two premises.
The fundamental error in the court's three-step analysis lies
in its confusion of the issues of uniformity of taxation and the
legislative power to classify property for taxation. To understand
the court's error requires a detailed analysis of amendment 14 to
the Washington Constitution. In brief, the logic demonstrating
the court's confusion can be stated as follows: The court dicho-
tomized the treatment of property taxes and excise taxes, holding
that property taxes are subject to the uniformity clause and ex-
cise taxes are not. The court reasoned that the income tax, as a
property tax, does not satisfy the requisites of the uniformity
clause because of the necessary legislative classifications of in-
come inherent in any net income tax scheme. Therefore, the court
interpreted the concept of "uniformity" to restrict the power of
4 . 1,4... 1,. * I y" in. any sgifu*,int way for
tli lglslature to .3 clsfy... ... a
the purposes of taxation.
Uniformity, as we will demonstrate, is a distinct issue which
should neither be confused with nor allowed to encroach upon the
analysis of the legislature's power to classify for tax purposes. The
proper analysis of any tax measure under amendment 14, which
requires that "all taxes shall be uniform upon the same class of
property," should entail: (1) ascertaining what legislative classi-
fications are made; (2) scrutinizing the classifications under
equal protection criteria; and (3) if any classifications of property
are made, determining if the tax is uniform within each class of
property. That analysis should be applied to any tax measure,
whether property (including income) or excise. If a net income tax
were properly so analyzed under amendment 14, it would be valid
under equal protection and uniformity criteria even if character-
ized as a property tax. 4
14. If an income tax were approved by the state supreme court without an enabling
constitutional amendment changing the constitutional definition of property, which
would be made possible if the reasoning of this article were adopted, a series of other
limitations and ramifications would become relevant. See Harsch & Shipman, supra note
11, at 247.
The most significant of these is the one-percent limitation on levies imposed by the
Washington Constitution: "[the aggregate of all tax levies upon real and personal prop-
erty by the state ... shall not in any year exceed one percentum of the true and fair value
of such property in money." WASH. CONsT. amend. 55. If income is property, this provision
arguably places a one-percent limit on any net income tax. It should be noted, however,
that the limit applies expressly to taxes on real and personal property. Thus, even if
income is property, it is not a foregone conclusion that it falls into either of those two
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This article is organized chronologically. Starting with an
examination of the original constitutional provisions, we then
analyze the adoption and wording of amendment 14. We follow
with a description and analysis of the court's interpretation of
amendment 14, the uniformity clause in particular, juxtaposing
the court's progressive analysis of legislative tax classification in
areas other than property taxation. We conclude that the time is
at hand for the Washington Supreme Court to adopt a single
consistent analysis of legislative tax classification, and to articu-
late the conceptually distinct requirements necessary to achieve
uniform taxation of legislatively selected classes of property.
II. THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT: THE ORIGINAL ARTICLE 7 AND ITS
INTERPRETATION
Prior to the adoption of amendment 14 to the Washington
Constitution, it made no mention of the power to classify for
taxation. Article 7, entitled "Revenue and Taxation," originally
read, in pertinent part, as follows:
Section 1 ANNUAL STATE TAX - All property in the state,
not exempt under the laws of the United States, or under this
Constitution, shall be taxed in proportion to its value, to be
ascertained as provided by law ....
Section 2 TAXATION - UNIFORMITY AND EQUALITY -
EXEMPTION - The legislature shall provide by law a uniform
and equal rate of assessment and taxation on all property in the
state, according to its value in money, and shall prescribe such
regulations by general law as shall secure a just valuation for
taxation, of all property, so that every person and corporation
shall pay a tax in proportion to the value of his, her or its
property; Provided, that a deduction of debts from credit may
be authorized; Provided further, that property of the United
States and of the state, counties, school districts, and other
municipal corporations, and such other property as the legisla-
ture may by general law provide, shall be exempt from taxation;
And provided further5 that the legislature shall have power, by
appropriate legislation, to exempt personal property to the
amount of [three hundred dollars] $300 for each head of a
family liable to assessment and taxation under the provisions of
classes of property for the purposes of this constitutional limitation. All constitutional
amendments establishing levy limitations were approved long after the court interpreted
amendment 14 to invalidate a tax on net income. Hence, the limitations of article 7,
section 2, could well be held inapplicable to income taxation, an option not available at
the time such amendments were adopted.
15. This proviso was added in 1900. See WASH. CONST. amend. 3.
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the laws of this state of which the individual is the actual and
bona fide owner.
Section 3 ASSESSMENT OF CORPORATE PROPERTY -
The legislature shall provide by general law for the assessing and
levying of taxes on all corporation property as near as may be
by the same methods as are provided for the assessing and levy-
ing of taxes on individual property.
Section 4 NO SURRENDER OF POWER OR SUSPENSION
OF TAX ON CORPORATE PROPERTY ......
The cited sections expressly applied to .nd imposed limitations
on the power to tax property. Taken together they show that the
framers considered property the principal source of the state's
revenue. 17
The journal of the state's constitutional convention casts no
authoritative light on the desires or intentions of the framers of
Article 7. However, the language fairly read mandates that all
property 8 be treated alike. It was all to be taxed with only the
11 e na -. ,-4A e - . .,.. , a , q,, -. -, . ,, ., ,.Alirr
to its value, with a uniform method of valuation, a uniform and
equal rate of assessment, and pursuant to uniform and equal tax
rates. 9 The framers granted no power to classify property other
than a limited power of exemption, and no distinction based on
the nature of the property owner was permissible.
With only the clearly stated intent of the framers to tax all
property uniformly and equally as a starting point, the court
proceeded to flesh out the details of the various constitutional
limitations.2 Predictably, the court held that, in fact, property
could not be classified for special treatment or exemption,2' that
16. WASH. CONST. art. 7 (emphasis added).
17. Culliton v. Chase, 174 Wash. 363, 385-87, 25 P.2d 81, 86 (1933); see also Harsch,
The Washington Tax System-How It Grew, 39 WASH. L. REv. 944, 948 (1965).
18. The framers rejected providing a definitional list of what constitutes property in
favor of allowing the courts to flesh out a general definition. THE JOURNAL OF THE WASHING-
TON STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 1889 651 (Rosenow ed. 1962).
19. The court noted in State ex rel. Wolfe v. Parmenter, 50 Wash. 164, 96 P. 1047
(1908): "One requirement of the Constitution is as mandatory in its nature as another. It
is just as imperative that taxation shall be uniform and equal upon all property as it is
that all property shall be taxed." Id. at 175, 96 P. at 1049.
20. Prior to the adoption of amendment 14, there was a dearth of property tax cases
considering issues of legislative classification, particularly those classification issues ad-
dressed subsequently in the net income tax cases. This is understandable in view of the
explicit and clear requirement in the original article 7 that all property be subject to
uniform and equal rates of assessment and taxation; no legislature would flout such an
unequivocal mandate by expressly classifying property for varying tax treatment. Thus,
the cases cited in the ensuing textual discussion illustrate the court's posture with respect
to the meaning and effect of the original uniformity and equality clause.
21. In State ex rel. Chamberlain v. Daniel, 17 Wash. 111, 49 P. 243 (1897), the court
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double taxation of the same economic asset in two different
classes of property was not appropriate,2 and that strict adher-
ence to uniform and equal rates of assessment and taxation was
essential.2 3 Only a few minor deviations from the absolute of uni-
form taxation of property were permissible. Special assessments
against particular land, designed to compensate for special bene-
fits, were allowed, 2 and the legislature possessed a limited power
to classify either as personalty or realty for administrative pur-
poses .25
held invalid a $500 personal property exemption per person and a $500 real estate improve-
ments exemption per person, because such exemptions violated the strict requirement of
equality in taxation, and because the legislative power to exempt, WASH. CONsT. art. 7, §
2, was limited to property of the same character as that expressly exempted in the consti-
tution, i.e., public or quasi-public property. The Chamberlain decision prompted amend-
ment 3 to the constitution, providing a similar personal exemption.
In Pacific Cold Storage Co. v. Pierce County, 85 Wash. 626, 149 P. 34 (1915), the court
reiterated that the constitution mandated a uniform and equal tax on all property "in the
state." Hence, the legislature could not lawfully exempt a ship engaged in interstate
commerce, but domiciled, registered, and owned in Washington. The court held it was
"corporeal personal property having an intrinsic value and having a situs at some place
within the state." Id. at 628, 149 P. at 34.
22. The court refused to require a shareholder to pay personal tax levied against
his corporate stock when the corporate assets, representing the stock liability, were taxed
as real or personal property to the corporation. This is considered double taxation, and
though not unconstitutional per se, legislative intent to impose such taxation would not
be inferred. Ridpath v. Spokane County, 23 Wash. 436, 440, 63 P. 261, 263 (1901),
overruled on other grounds, Spokane and Eastern Trust Co. v. Spokane County, 70 Wash.
48, 51, 126 P. 54, 55 (1912). See also Lewiston Water & Power Co. v. Asotin County, 24
Wash. 371, 64 P. 544 (1901) (corporation successfully challenges tax assessed against its
outstanding shares). This form of double taxation was labelled a violation of uniformity
and equality standards in State ex rel. Wolfe v. Parmenter, 50 Wash. 164, 96 P. 1047
(1908). See note 31 and accompanying text infra.
Interestingly, Ridpath is often cited as authority for the inherent legislative power to
classify property: "The classification of property for assessment, where uniformity and
equality exist in the classes, is a matter of legislative policy.... While the legislature may
so adjust the revenue system as to occasion double taxation, such taxation will not be
inferred unless necessarily imposed in carrying out the law." 23 Wash. at 440, 63 P. at
263. In context, however, this statement does not concern differentiating two classes of
property for different tax treatment, but rather the power of the legislature to deal with a
given set of objects at all, whether as personalty, realty, or even as property.
23. The court has held that arbitrary valuations violate uniformity and equality
requirements, as do differing rates of assessment on timber land versus other land. Weyer-
haeuser Timber Co. v. Pierce County, 97 Wash. 534, 540-44, 167 P. 35, 37-39 (1917).
24. State ex rel. Stranger v. Bartlett, 112 Wash. 299, 301-06, 192 P. 945, 945-47 (1920).
The requirement that the special assessments relate directly to benefits conferred was a
strict one. In Bartlett, the court declared void an assessment to set up a pest control
district because the land in the proposed district was not classified according to the
benefits each parcel would receive from pest control.
25. Puget Sound Power & Light Co. v. Seattle, 117 Wash. 351, 355-67, 201 P. 449,
451-54 (1921), aff'd on rehearing, 117 Wash. 367, 207 P. 689 (1922), aff'd on equal protec-
tion grounds, 264 U.S. 22, 26-30 (1924). In upholding the power of the legislature to classify
for administrative purposes in Puget Sound Power, the court concluded that assessing a
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In light of this constitutional framework for the uniform and
equal taxation of property 2 it is understandable that the court
would interpret more broadly the legislative power to define
classes for excise taxes. 27 In reality, the distinction was not one
of differing rules depending on the nature of the tax, but rather
one of express limitations on the power to classify for property
taxation, and no express limitations on the power to classify for
excise taxation. From the equal protection limitations implicit in
the state privileges and immunities clause the court fashioned a
street railroad's "operating property" as personal property was appropriate, even though
its operating property actually included personalty and realty (in the form of easements),
so long as there was uniform and equal taxation within the classes of personalty and realty.
The court noted that the "realty" statutorily included in "operating property" generally
was not of a fee interest character, and hence was amenable to different administrative
treatment. The court quoted sweeping statements supporting legislative discretion to
classify property from Chicago & Northwestern R. Co. v. State, 128 Wis. 553, 108 N.W.
557 (1906).
Puget Sound Power, however, only acknowledged the power to classify a given object
as personalty or realty, not the power to suic.assify thOse groups............r .ted hat
limited classification power for administrative convenience. It also presumed a uniform
and equal rate of assessment and taxation on all property. Furthermore, as the United
States Supreme Court noted at the time of the Puget Sound Power holdings, the only
distinctions in Washington's taxation of personalty (versus realty) concerned: (1) the date
of payment; (2) the penalty for delinquency; (3) the power to sell the assessed property
upon delinquency; and (4) the right of redemption in the taxpayer.
The Washington Supreme Court determined the propriety of the legislative treatment
of the class of "street railroad operating property" based on state uniformity and equality
notions and also federal equal protection considerations. The Supreme Court examined
the Washington court's decision on that issue strictly in light of federal equal protection
criteria, but compared the two standards:
[The cited cases] involved the application of somewhat stringent provisions of
state constitutions as to equality of taxation on all kinds of property which left
but little room for classification. Such restrictions have much embarrassed state
legislatures because actual equality of taxation is unattainable. The theoretical
operation of a tax is often very different from its practical incidence, due to the
weakness of human nature and anxiety to escape tax burdens. This justifies the
legislature, where the Constitution does not forbid, in adopting variant provi-
sions as to rate, the assessment and the collection for different kinds of property.
The reports of this court are full of cases which demonstrate that the Fourteenth
Amendment [United States Constitution] was not intended, and is not be
[sic] be construed, as having any such object as these stiff and unyielding
requirements of equality in state constitutions.
264 U.S. at 27-28.
26. "Property taxes may be regarded as levies on the entire bundle of rights of owner-
ship, as distinguished from a levy on the exercise of a special power of ownership .
J. HELLERSTEIN, STATE AND LocAL TAXATION (CASES AND MATERIALS) 25 (3rd ed. 1969).
27. The obligation to pay an excise is based upon the voluntary action of
the person taxed in performing the act, enjoying the privilege, or engaging in
the occupation which is the subject of the excise, and the element of absolute
and unavoidable demand, as in the case of a property tax is lacking.
Black v. State, 67 Wash. 2d 97, 99, 406 P.2d 761, 762 (1965) (quoting 1 COOLEY, TAXATION
§ 46, at 132 (4th ed. 1924)).
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set of classification guidelines for excise taxes, a source of revenue
not mentioned and one the framers either did not foresee or one
they determined did not require specific constitutional guide-
lines.2" Concluding that both the inheritance tax" and the capita-
tion tax30 were not taxes on property, and hence outside the pur-
view of the uniformity provisions, the court applied its equal
protection guidelines. Thus, the inheritance tax decision ac-
knowledged legislative discretion to classify a legacy by such fac-
tors as the identity of the taxpayer and the amount of property
in defining exemptions and setting rates.
With such decisions, the court developed its analytical ap-
proach to the constitutionality of classifications made by the leg-
islature in any tax measure. Because of the strictures of article 7
of the constitution, expressly applicable only to property taxes,
and because of the lack of any express constitutional limitations
on excise taxation, the court recognized and formalized a dichot-
omy: the first analytical step in any tax case was to determine
whether the tax was a property tax or an excise tax. If a property
tax, the measure was further analyzed under the strict rules of
article 7 which permitted no classification of property, except as
between personalty and realty for administrative purposes. If an
excise tax, the measure was further analyzed under a different
28. Pacific Nat'l Bank v. Pierce County, 20 Wash. 675, 56 P. 936 (1899), sustained a
tax levied against shareholders on the assessed value of their bank stock. The court held
that the tax was an excise on the bank's corporate franchise, and not a tax on the bank's
property. The statute measured the value of the stock by the value of the bank's assets,
including stock in other corporations. Even though such other corporations were taxed on
their property, it was held not improper to impose an excise tax on the bank using the
bank's stock holdings in those corporations as a partial measure. Because the property of
the bank was not taxed directly, no double taxation of the assets of such other corporations
resulted.
Without disturbing the validity of this method of assessing bank stock (a double
taxation issue), Spokane & Eastern Trust Co. v. Spokane County, 70 Wash. 48, 51, 126
P. 54, 55 (1912), overruled Pacific Nat'l Bank, concluding that such a tax was a property
tax. The Spokane & Eastern Trust court also overruled what it believed a like holding,
Ridpath v. Spokane County, 23 Wash. 436, 63 P. 261 (1901). Ridpath, however, had merely
cited Pacific Nat'l Bank as inapposite.
29. State v. Clark, 30 Wash. 439, 71 P. 20 (1902). The inheritance tax, imposed on
property transfers from a decedent to his legatees or heirs, was held to be an excise, with
consequent discretion in the legislature to classify the subjects of taxation. The tax up-
held in Clark was progressive, with the rate based on the degree of kinship and the amount
of property passed.
30. Nipges v. Thornton, 119 Wash. 464, 206 P. 17 (1922). A poll or capitation tax of
five dollars per person, with exemptions for minors, elderly, and the infirm, was held valid.
The court interpreted sections I and 2 of the Washington Constitution, article 7, to apply
exclusively to "property" taxes, but not to preclude the existence of non-"property"
sources of revenue. Thus, the court concluded that the legislature could exempt certain
classes from a poll tax, a non-property source of revenue.
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and less stringent set of rules for legislative classification devel-
oped under the privileges and immunities clause.
The restrictive effects on fiscal planners and policy makers
of the strict rules of uniformity in property taxation were high-
lighted in 1908 in State ex rel. Wolfe v. Parmenter.3 ' Due to the
difficulty of enforcing the taxation of intangibles on the same
basis as real property and tangible personal property, the legisla-
ture attempted to exempt money and certain intangibles from ad
valorem taxation.32 Rather than permitting the exemption of cer-
tain intangibles as a class of property (such a result would be an
impermissible violation of uniformity and equality require-
ments), the court decided that "credits" were not necessarily
included in "all property." Thus, rather than subclassify property
and exempt one subclass, the court redefined the phrase "all
property" to exclude certain items. The exemption of money,
however, which has intrinsic value and is therefore tangible prop-
erty, was held an improper attempt to tax one class of property
differently from other classes. Thus, due to strict uniformity re-
quirements, money had to be taxed uniformly with all other per-
sonal property even though as a practical matter the enforcement
and collection of an ad valorem tax on money was impossible.
The need for more flexibility in the taxation of property,
exemplified by decisions such as Parmenter, finally led to amend-
ment of the constitution in 1930.33
III. THE CONSTITUTONAL AMENDMENT
At the turn of the century, taxation of property satisfied the
state's fiscal needs. However, what at first had appeared to be an
31. 50 Wash. 164, 96 P. 1047 (1908).
32. In 1907 the legislature attempted to exclude "mortgages, notes, accounts,
moneys, certificates of deposit, tax certificates, judgments, state,,county, municipal and
school district bonds and warrants" from the scope of "all property" to avoid the consti-
tutional mandate that all property be taxed. 1907 Wash. Laws, ch. 48, at 69. The Par-
menter court held that except for moneys, the above items were "credits" and were rep-
resentative of underlying property, analogous to shares of corporate stock representing the
issuing corporation's assets. 50 Wash. at 174-75, 96 P. at 1049 (citing Ridpath and Lewis-
ton, see note 22 supra).
Thus, the court held it was a matter of legislative discretion to exclude these credits
from "all property" and thereby avoid double taxation of essentially the same assets. The
court also noted that such double taxation would violate principles of uniformity and
equality.
The cogent dissent by Justice Fullerton is noteworthy. It rebuts the "property,"
double-taxation, and uniformity and equality arguments of the majority, concluding that
even the credits should be taxed..
33. The court draws this very conclusion in State ex rel. Atwood v. Wooster, 163
Wash. 659, 661-63, 2 P.2d 653, 653-55 (1931).
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egalitarian and reasonable requirement that all taxation of that
primary source of revenue be carefully circumscribed by strict
rules of uniformity and equality proved to be a major obstacle in
the path of efforts to modify the tax structure to permit more
variety and selectivity in the sources and methods of exacting
revenue and to provide relief for the ad valorem taxpayer. The
power to classify property for taxation purposes would provide the
desired flexibility and open up new sources of revenue. Thus, in
1929, the legislature submitted a constitutional amendment to
the state's voters. As finally approved by the people, amendment
14 replaced the Washington Constitution's article 7, sections 1
through 4, with the following:
Art. 7, Sec. 1 TAXATION. The power of taxation shall never
be suspended, surrendered or contracted away. All taxes shall
be uniform upon the same class of property within the territorial
limits of the authority levying the tax and shall be levied and
collected for public purposes only. The word 'property' as used
herein shall mean and include everything, whether tangible or
intangible, subject to ownership. All real estate shall constitute
one class; Provided, that the legislature may tax mines and
mineral resources and lands devoted to reforestation by either
a yield tax or an ad valorem tax at such rate as it may fix, or
by both. Such property as the legislature may by general laws
provide shall be exempt from taxation. Property of the United
States and of the state, counties, school districts and other mu-
nicipal corporations, and credits secured by property actually
taxed in this state, not exceeding in value the value of such
property, shall be exempt from taxation. The legislature shall
have power, by appropriate legislation, to exempt personal
property to the amount of three hundred ($300.00) dollars for
each head of a family liable to assessment and taxation under
the provisions of the laws of this state of which the individual
is the actual bona fide owner.34
The wording and subsequent interpretation of this provision pre-
sent for analysis the critical questions: "What effect should this
amendment have had on legislative discretion to classify property
for tax purposes?" and "What effect did it have?"
The available sources of information on legislative intent and
popular understanding of the amendment are quite meager. Un-
fortunately, there are no express statements of intent, only infer-
ences. The first sources are the legislative journals5 which pro-
34. WASH. CONST. amend. 14 (emphasis added).
35. WASH. H. & S. J. (1929). See generally WASH. H.R. 429, 21st Sess. (1929).
19781
266 University of Puget Sound Law Review
vide primarily routine administrative information. However,
from the Senate Journal of 1929, we can compare the original
version of House Bill No. 429,3 the Senate's recommended
changes, 37 and the bill as adopted. 38 The original House bill pro-
vided:
Section 1. All taxes shall be uniform on the same class of prop-
erty and shall be levied and collected for public purposes only.
The legislature shall have the power to exempt from taxation
such property as it deems advisable. For the purpose of taxation
property shall consist of and be classified as follows:
Class 1. All real estate.
Class 2. All tangible personal property.
Class 3. All intangible personal property ....
There are two critical factors in comparing the language quoted
with the then existing constitutional provision. First, the original
House bill would give the legislature broad discretion to exempt
property from taxation, 3 thereby permitting the selection of
classes of property which would not be taxed. Second, even
though expressly providing for the division of property into
classes upon which taxes were to be uniform, it circumscribed the
discretion of the legislature by prescribing only three permissible
classes.
The Senate response was to recommend changing the bill
into essentially the present form of amendment 14 with only one
significant difference. That difference was the exclusion of the
proposed House bill's broad discretionary power to exempt prop-
erty from taxation, and the substitution therefor of the exemption
proviso from the original article 7, section 2, which had been
interpreted so restrictively. 0
A Committee on Free Conference eventually resolved the
differences, consistently adopting the provisions from the pro-
posed versions which gave the legislature greater latitude in
drafting tax measures. Thus, the committee adopted the broader
power to classify property proposed in the Senate version, with
the only limitation that "real estate" must be treated as one class
of property; and the broader plenary power to exempt property
36. WASH. S.J. 631 (1929).
37. Id. at 630.
38. Id. at 702.
39. The discretionary power to exempt property from taxation negated the limita-
tions of State ex rel. Chamberlain v. Daniel, 17 Wash. 111, 49 P. 243 (1897). See note 21
supra.
40. See note 21 and text acccompanying notes 21 and 31 supra.
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from taxation proposed in the House version, thereby rejecting
the restrictively interpreted power of exemption in the then exist-
ing article 7. In this final Free Conference Committee version,
each house of the legislature approved" by the required two-
thirds majority a. synthesized amendment which provided a
greater degree of flexibility than that allowed by either of the
proposed bills.
The second helpful source for interpreting amendment 14 is
an opinion of the Washington Attorney General.'" The opinion
was issued in response to a series of questions posed by the Advi-
sory Tax Commission. 3 After analyzing the then existing article
41. WASH. H.J. 812 (1929); WASH. S.J. 703 (1929).
42. 29-30 WASH. Op. Arr'Y GEN. 431 (1930).
43. The questions posed in the letter dated December 5, 1929, from the Advisory Tax
Commission were:
1. Does the provision exempting 'property of the United States and of the
state, counties, school districts, and other municipal corporations' apply under
the wording of the amendment as a whole to the property tax alone or also to
excise and privilege taxes?
Id.
2. With the exception of the specific exemptions of governmental property
and of certain credits as set forth in the amendment does the amendment give
the legislature full power either to tax or exempt all other taxable property in
this state, so as to overcome the effect of our Supreme Court decision in the case
of Chamberlain v. Daniel, (17 Wash. 111) and later decisions? What effect, if
any, does the insertion of the $300.00 property exemption have on the free power
of the legislature to exempt other property that it wants to?
Id. at 436.
3. Does the provision defining property to 'mean and include everything
whether tangible or intangible subject to ownership' compel any income tax in
this state to be construed by the court to be a property tax?
Id. at 438.
4. If an income tax would be a property tax under this amendment would
an income tax with progressive rates and with the usual form of exemptions be
legal under this amendment as a whole?
Id. at 440.
5. Would this definition of property make our existing excise taxes prop-
erty.taxes?
Id. at 441.
6. Does the provision specifically exempting 'credits secured by property
actually taxed in this state' prevent the taxation of the income from such credits
by an income, excise or privilege tax?
Id.
7. Does this provision present any legal complications with respect to the
taxation of national banks under sec. 5219 of the U.S. Revised Statutes?
Id.
8. Referring to article 7, section 2 of the constitution of the state of Wash-
ington, does the provision that the legislature shall have power by appropriate
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7, the case law, and the proposed article 7, the Attorney General
concluded: (1) With reference to the power to exempt property
from taxation:
We see no reason why this language should not be given the
effect evidently intended, and authorize the legislature to ex-
empt from taxation any property it sees fit, thereby overcoming
the effect of the decision of our supreme court in the case of
Chamberlain v. Daniel, 17 Wash. 111, and any other decisions
restricting the power of the legislature to grant exemp-
tions. .... .
(2) With reference to the power to tax income:
[W]ith "intangibles" brought into the constitution under the
definition of "property" and with the power to classify granted
by the proposed amendment, the objection that to hold such a
tax a property tax would render it invalid, is removed, and the
courts would have no such reasons to hesitate to declare the tax
a property tax, as the tax would be valid as a property tax under
the proposed Amendment. 5
(3) With reference to a progressive income tax:
If all income were treated as one class of property, an income
tax law with progressive rates would violate this provision ["all
taxes shall be uniform on the same class of property"]. We
believe, however, that the court would, if necessary to sustain
such a law, hold each group to be a separate class, provided the
classification were reasonable. The power to graduate rates has
been sustained by many courts, and by the Supreme Court of
the United States as to the Federal income tax law .... If an
income tax law were construed as an excise tax, any reasonable
rate classification would be sustained. However, even if con-
strued as a property tax, although not entirely free from doubt,
it is our opinion that such an act "with progressive rates and the
usual form of exemption" would be sustained."
legislation to exempt personal property to the amount of $300.00 for each head
of a family, preclude the legislature from enacting a law excluding automobiles
from such an exemption?
Id. at 445.
44. Id. at 436.
45. Id. at 439. The response to whether, because of the expansive definition of prop-
erty in the proposed constitutional amendment, income would be considered property
says, in effect, that it really does not matter. The attorney general concluded that with
the new power to classify property granted in the amendment, the legislature could tax
income, even if such a tax were considered a property tax.
46. Id. at 440-41. The attorney general makes reference to the fact that the progres-
sive federal income tax did not come under a similar constitutional provision (i.e., a
uniformity clause). However, it should be noted that the 16th amendment to the United
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It is apparent that the Attorney General considered the limita-
tions on the state's plenary power of taxation embodied in
amendment 14 to be broadly permissive in the areas of exemption
and classification.
Another source of contemporary interpretation is the histori-
cal sequence of events which quickly followed. The principal in-
terest groups within the state surely would have been aware of the
Attorney General's opinion of December, 1929, and .would have
communicated its content, positively or negatively, throughout
the state. With that information in hand, the voters adopted
amendment 14 in November, 1930. At the next general election
in November, 1932, the voters by initiative enacted a graduated
net income tax.47 Thus, the voters, by their actions demonstrated
that they believed the income tax not only to be appropriate, but
also within the limitations they had defined only two years ear-
lier.
How did the state supreme court analyze the effect of amend-
ment 14 in the first taxation decisions following its adoption? In
1931, in State ex rel. Atwood v. Wooster,48 the court upheld legis-
lation classifying money, together with certain intangibles, as one
class of property and exempting it from ad valorem taxation. In
an expansive discussion of the purpose and effect of the "drastic
and radical change" wrought by amendment 14, the court said:
[T]he requirements that a uniform tax be assessed against all
property were swept away, and in their place were adopted con-
stitutional provisions which say nothing about uniformity, and
do not provide that all property shall be taxed, but which do
permit of the classification of all property, and provide that all
taxes shall be uniform upon the same class of property, and also
that such property as the legislature may provide shall be ex-
empt from taxation. So that the legislature, freed from the for-
mer limitations, may now determine what property shall be
taxed, the different rates upon which different classes of prop-
erty shall be taxed, and what property shall pay no tax at all,
subject only to the limitations found in the new constitutional
provisions."°
States Constitution makes no express provision for classification or progressive rates.
Thus, a determination of the propriety of the federal income tax was left to the Supreme
Court's interpretation of that and other constitutional provisions, most notably the equal
protection clause.
47. 1933 Wash. Laws, ch. 5, at 49.
48. 163 Wash. 659, 2 P.2d 653 (1931).
49. Id. at 663, 2 P.2d at 655.
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The court also referred broadly to the abrogation of former
restrictions on classification of property in State ex rel. Mason
County Logging Co. v. Wiley"° where it stated:
It is a matter of common knowledge that the purpose of the
fourteenth amendment was to permit a departure from the rigid
requirement of uniformity and equality, making it possible to
classify different kinds of property and levy different rates ac-
cording to classes, to the end, largely, that the classes of prop-
erty known as intangibles might be taxed at rates low enough
to offer no inducement for concealment or evasion. While the
rule prescribing general uniformity regardless of class of prop-
erty was abolished by the amendment, uniformity is still re-
quired within the classes.'
Based on the foregoing inferences, interpretations, and state-
ments, it would appear that the legislative, executive, popular,
and judicial sectors each regarded amendment 14 at the time of
its passage and shortly thereafter as a dramatic relaxation of the
50. 177 Wash. 65, 31 P.2d 539 (1934). The court upheld 1931 Wash. Laws., ch. 40, at
117, from an attack based on amendment 14. In Wiley, the court validated a law fixing
the value of reforestation lands, differentiating lands west of the Cascade Mountains (one
dollar per acre) from lands east of the Cascades (fifty cents per acre). The law was
sustained on an extremely permissive interpretation of the legislature's power to set the
rate of tax under the Reforestation Land Proviso. The court considered the historical
context of the proviso, and noted: "The carefully prepared act of the 1931 session of the
legislature is a contemporaneous construction of the amendment by men who participated
in drafting and submitting it to the people." Id. at 74, 31 P.2d at 543.
51. Id. at 70, 31 P.2d at 542 (dictum). Note that Wiley was decided after the court's
restrictive interpretation of the uniformity clause in Culliton. In addition, the language
is not explicitly inconsistent with the generic classification of property, a major element
in the Culliton holding.
However, it must be noted that the law challenged in Wiley escaped invalidation only
because its validity depended not on the restrictively construed uniformity clause, but on
the Reforestation Land Proviso. Over a strident dissent by Justice Steinert, (the champion
of restrictive uniformity doctrine), the Culliton dissenters demonstrated their continuing
commitment to a permissive interpretation of the uniformity clause.
Justice Blake described the purpose of amendment 14 in its historical context in his
Culliton dissent:
A growing agitation for decrease in taxes developed. But the relief was not
available, because the state found itself in a straight-jacket in the shape of
Article VI of the Constitution, with the judicial interpretations that had been
placed upon it ....
174 Wash. at 386-87, 25 P.2d at 86.
As I see it, the real question presented on this appeal is whether, by con-
struction of this amendment, we are going to thwart the effort of the state to
throw off the strait-jacket in which it was bound. To do so requires a literal,
technical construction of a few words of the amendment, in perversion of their
true and obvious intent and purpose, and in total disregard of its historical
background and the conditions which brought it into being.
Id. at 388, 25 P.2d at 87.
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limits on the legislative power in the field of taxation. The old
strict rule mandating taxation of all property, allowing no mean-
ingful subclassification, and requiring absolute uniformity and
equality in that process had been swept away; the only explicit
limitation on the power of the legislature to classify property for
taxation or exemption was that real estate could not be subclassi-
fied at all.
Amendment 14 had thus introduced a new analytic step: the
propriety of legislative classifications. Each new tax measure
would have to be scrutinized to ascertain whether lines were
drawn and classes of property created. Such legislative classifica-
tions should be tested according to a set of principles developing
under the federal equal protection clause and the state privileges
and immunity clause.52 If the classifications were found to be
reasonable, that is, not arbitrary, capricious, or invidiously dis-
criminatory,53 then the second issue would be reached: if the legis-
lature created classes of property, was the tax imposed uniformly
on each class created? Thus, the uniformity clause would retain
its full vitality only in the area of taxation in which it was most
meaningful and effective; that area of taxation which the framers
envisioned as the primary source of state revenue; that area of
taxation for which the amenders sought to retain the clause's
effectiveness: ad valorem taxation of realty.
IV. Culliton AND THE UNIFORMITY CLAUSE
Unfortunately, the issues never fell into place as anticipated.
Instead, the court withdrew from its correct interpretation of
amendment 14 in Atwood54 and returned to the analytical dichot-
omy developed under the old constitutional provision: taxes on
"property" versus all other taxes-in effect, excises. Rather than
developing a single consistent set of rules for classification per se
(whether of property, occupations, activities, or taxpayers), the
52. The United States Supreme Court, in its equal protection decisions, provides the
basis for most Washington decisions on issues of legislation discretion to classify. See note
8 supra, and note 106 infra.
53. Texas Co. v. Cohn, 8 Wash. 2d 360, 370, 112 P.2d 522, 527 (1941) (citing State
Bd. of Tax Comm'rs of Indiana v. Jackson, 283 U.S. 527, 537 (1931)).
54. See text accompanying note 48 supra. It is noteworthy, and perhaps determina-
tive of this reversal, that significant changes in the court's membership occurred between
the decisions in Atwood and Culliton. The Atwood opinion was written by Chief Justice
Tolman, and joined by Justices Beals, Holcomb, Mitchell, Main, Millard, Parker, and
Beeler. By the time of the Culliton opinion, just two years later, the court was composed
of Chief Justice Beals and Justices Tolman, Holcomb, Mitchell, Main, Millard, Blake,
Geraghty, and the influential Justice Steinert.
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court evolved a system of analysis which first determined whether
a tax fell either on property or on a privilege. It then applied
different rules of legislative classification, with those for property
very restrictive and those for excises quite permissive.
When the court determined that a tax fell upon property,
rather than analyzing the classes of property drawn in terms of
equal protection concepts and the explicit limitation on the clas-
sification of realty, it would analyze the classifications in terms
of the uniformity of the tax. This notion is astonishing because
uniformity is conceptually antithetical to classification. The
problem is not one, however, of an irreconcilable conflict between
two disparate concepts tied together in the language of amend-
ment 14's uniformity clause. Rather, the problem is one of the
court analytically placing the cart before the horse: A tax can
clearly be uniform upon all property within a class; but just as
clearly a tax cannot be uniform upon an entire class if that class
is subclassified for the purposes of varying tax treatment.
A proper analysis would recognize the constitutionally and
conceptually valid legislative discretion to define classes, subject
to equal protection standards. Any tax must then be uniform
upon each of those classes. We reject the view that the court may
impose uniformity, as a constitutional requisite for the validity
of a tax, at any level of classification other than the precise
classes drawn by the legislature, except in the instance of realty,
a mandatory irreducible class. To accept such a view would be
to acknowledge the court's discretion to determine to what level
or degree the legislature may classify for taxation purposes. Yet
the view we reject is the very position the court adopted in a
series of decisions beginning in 1933 concerning net income taxes
on the one hand and a variety of excise taxes on the other.
The court forced itself into this untenable but staunchly
maintained posture in the companion decisions of Culliton v.
Chase 5 and State ex rel. Stiner v. Yelle.56 In Culliton the court
invalidated the state's newly and popularly adopted graduated
income tax, 57 levied on the receipt of income, and measured by
"net" income. The rationale was appealingly simple: (1) income
is property; (2) because it is property, taxation thereof is subject
to the uniformity clause; and (3) the classifications inherent in a
graduated net income tax violate uniformity rules and are thus
invalid.
55. 174 Wash. 363, 25 P.2d 81 (1933).
56. 174 Wash. 402, 25 P.2d 91 (1933).
57. 1933 Wash. Laws, ch. 5, at 49.
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In contrast, the court's Stiner decision upheld the state's
newly adopted business and occupation tax,58 levied on the privi-
lege of engaging in business activities, and measured by one or
another form of gross proceeds from the activity. The rationale
was again appealingly simple: (1) an "activity" is not property;
(2) because it is not property, taxation thereof is not subject to
the uniformity clause, but rather to the classification criteria of
equal protection concepts; and (3) the business and occupation
tax, utilizing reasonable classifications under those criteria, is
valid.
The necessary conclusion, confirmed in subsequent cases, is
that the uniformity clause embodies a distinct, highly restrictive
set of rules governing legislative discretion to classify. However,
this tortured expansion of the uniformity clause, resulting from
legislative efforts to enact an income tax, has only been applied
in the income tax cases. Thus, the conclusion is inescapable that
the court indeed considers income taxation in Washington in a
class by itself.
What are these classification rules imposed by the uniform-
ity clause? What is the reasoning underpinning the proscription
of certain legislative classifications? The rules and their underly-
ing reasons were articulated in Culliton and its progeny. This line
of cases established that uniformity standards are not met when
there is any legislative attempt: (1) to classify property (read
"income") by the nature of the owner or recipient (e.g., corpora-
tion vs. partnership or sole proprietor); (2) to classify property by
quantity (e.g., income by dollar amount); (3) to classify property
by status of the taxpayer (e.g., single vs. married); or (4) to clas-
sify property as an incidental result of taxing another class of
property (e.g., rental vs. nonrental property, by taxing rent as
income). The ensuing discussion focuses primarily on the court's
reasoning in engrafting these four rules of classification into the
uniformity clause.
To understand the reasoning of Culliton, it is first necessary
to consider Aberdeen Savings and Loan Association v. Chase,5'
which laid the foundation for the first of these four rules of classi-
fication. Although Aberdeen was decided before the adoption of
amendment 14 and did not discuss the issue of uniformity, its
impact on the judicial construction of amendment 14, and partic-
ularly the uniformity clause, has been profound. In Aberdeen the
58. 1933 Wash. Laws, ch. 191, at 869.
59. 157 Wash. 351, 289 P. 536 (1930).
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court invalidated a tax on banks and financial corporations, lev-
ied on the exercise of their corporate franchises, measured by net
income, and imposed at a flat rate.60 The decision was based
entirely on equal protection and intergovernmental immunity
principles. The court relied on the United States Supreme Court
decision of Quaker City Cab Co. v. Pennsylvania"' which had
invalidated a Pennsylvania tax on taxi cab companies, measured
by gross receipts, from which partnerships and individuals were
exempt, in effect taxing only corporations.
In Quaker City Cab, the Supreme Court had "looked
through" this alleged excise tax and, finding that corporations in
Pennsylvania were already subject to a separate franchise tax,
concluded that it was a tax imposed on the revenues of cab com-
panies. For purposes of a tax on revenues, however, the Court
deemed it unreasonable under the equal protection clause to dis-
tinguish cab companies owned by corporations from those owned
by individuals and partnerships. The Aberdeen court applied this
decision well beyond its rationale. It "looked through" the legisla-
ture's stated purpose of taxing the exercise of the corporate privi-
leges of banks and financial institutions, even though there was
no pre-existing general excise on these institutions in Washing-
ton, to find that the tax was in fact one on the income of the
institutions. The Aberdeen court then concluded, applying equal
protection standards, that it was unreasonable to distinguish the
income of corporations from that of individuals and partnerships.
In a separate issue concerning whether to include the income
from United States bonds and instruments in the measure of a
bank's net income, the Aberdeen court relied on MacAllen Co. v.
Massachusetts,6" in which the United States Supreme Court in-
validated a Massachusetts law which included the income from
United States instruments and bonds in the measure of a bank's
tax, holding that the particular facts indicated the tax measure
had been adopted to circumvent the immunity of United States
bonds and instruments from direct taxation. Again, the Aberdeen
court ignored the particular facts essential to that decision and
overstated the MacAlUen holding to support their conclusion that
taxing income from such instruments was equivalent to taxing
the instruments themselves, and that such a tax was therefore
invalid. With some strange amalgam of the rationale of those two
60. 1929 Wash. Laws, ch. 151, at 380.
61. 277 U.S. 389 (1928), overruled, Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410
U.S. 356, 365 (1973).
62. 279 U.S. 620 (1929).
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cases, which the court had already stretched beyond their hold-
ings, the court explained on rehearing what they had really held
in Aberdeen: "the legislation therein attacked must be held,
under the decisions of the supreme court of the United States, to
attempt to establish a property and not an excise or corporation
franchise tax."63 Thus, Aberdeen, which began as an equal pro-
tection challenge to discrimination against financial corporations
and an intergovernmental immunity challenge to including in-
come from United States bonds in the measure of the tax, re-
sulted in the propositions that a tax on net income is a tax on
property and, in that respect, discrimination between corpora-
tions and other taxable entities was impermissible.
The second phase of the decision, that it was impermissible
to single out corporations for special treatment, eventually was
transformed from a rule established under equal protection prin-
ciples into the first classification rule dictated by the uniformity
clause. Since Aberdeen was the genesis of that uniformity princi-
ple, it should be noted that in 1973 the United States Supreme
Court expressly overruled Quaker City Cab," upon which the
Aberdeen decision had so heavily relied, and the equal protection
clause rule established therein, holding that the differences in
mode of operation and the enjoyment of privileges inherent in the
corporate form were sufficient bases to single out corporations for
special treatment when levying personal property taxes.
With this contextual background, the court in Culliton v.
Chase laid down its basic approach to the analysis of a net income
tax under amendment 14. The decision in Culliton was evidently
difficult for the court; the majority opinion by Justice Holcomb,
joined by Justice Main, was bolstered by two concurring opinions,
resulting in a five-vote majority in the face of a unified four vote
dissent. It is noteworthy that in the companion opinion of State
ex rel. Stiner v. Yelle,65 Justice Holcomb switched sides, joining
the Culliton dissenters in a unified five-member majority uphold-
ing the business and occupation tax as an excise, not governed by
the uniformity clause.
The majority opinion in Culliton was devoted almost entirely
to a discussion of why income is property, the first step in the
Culliton rationale. The court argued that amendment 14's
unique, all-inclusive definition of property required the result;
63. This oft-quoted passage is found at 157 Wash. at 392, 290 P. at 697.
64. 277 U.S. 389 (1928), overruled, Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410
U.S. 356, 365 (1973).
65. 174 Wash. 402, 25 P.2d 91 (1933).
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that stare decisis mandated the decision in Aberdeen be followed;
and that other states' decisions upholding their income tax provi-
sions were inapposite. A fair reading of the wording of the uni-
formity clause mandates application of that clause to property
taxes, the second step in the Culliton rationale, though the court
did not explicitly set this forth in its opinion. Justice Holcomb's
reasoning in support of the final and critical step leaves much to
the imagination: "It needs no argument to demonstrate that the
income taxes here levied are wholly lacking in uniformity.""
After establishing the basic constitutional analysis applica-
ble to the net income tax, Justice Holcomb devoted the last por-
tion of his opinion to an effort to rebut the cogent argument that
the net income tax was in many ways indistinguishable from the
graduated inheritance tax, which had been upheld as an excise. 7
He thought it significant that the inheritance tax was levied only
upon the event of a devise and not annually, and that the right
to receive property as an heir is not a "natural right," but a state
granted privilege. One could question whether the legislative
selection of an annual income tax base for administrative conven-
ience, as opposed to taxing the recipient on each taxable event
(analogizing the receipt of income to receipt of a devise), should
govern the constitutionality of a tax scheme, and also whether,
under present constitutional doctrines, the right to receive in-
come is a "natural right."
Justices Mitchell and Millard concurred separately" to pro-
vide historical support for the majority position, and to analyze
further the requirements of uniformity. The historical argument
is interesting for its irony. Justice Mitchell noted that the
Aberdeen decision holding a tax on income to be a tax on property
was notorious at the time amendment 14 was passed, hence the
public knew at the time that property included income, yet they
engrafted an all-encompassing definition of property into the
state constitution, bolstering rather than eliminating the effect of
Aberdeen. Justice Mitchell failed to carry his historical analysis
one step further, however, to point out that within two years of
the passage of the amendment the public adopted this very in-
come tax, implying that they intended and believed the limita-
tions in the amendment to be sufficiently liberal to permit this
tax with its inherent classification of income (admittedly prop-
erty).
66. 174 Wash. at 378, 25 P.2d at 83.
67. State v. Clark, 30 Wash. 439, 71 P. 20 (1902).
68. 174 Wash. at 379, 25 P.2d at 84.
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Attempting to explain the nonuniformity of this graduated
tax on net income, and thereby creating the second classification
rule for uniformity, Justice Mitchell continued:
Confessedly, the Act upon its face fixes rates of taxation that
become greater with the increase of the amount of taxable in-
come. The Amendment to the Constitution provides, however,
"that all taxes shall be uniform upon the same class of property"
etc. This principle of uniformity in taxation has been preserved
at all times in our Constitution, as appears from Article VII, sec.
2 of the Constitution, and from the fourteenth amendment. It
might be reasonable, under the Amendment, to provide that, for
taxation purposes, horses be put in a class and bear a rate of
taxation different from that of lands devoted to reforestation;
but not so with a band of one thousand horses compared with
another of two thousand horses, nor one acre of land devoted to
reforestation compared with another two acres of land devoted
to reforestation.
The Constitutional Amendment speaks of the same class of
property. One who pays a tax on a $2000 taxable income pays a
tax on precisely the same class of property as one who pays a
tax on a $1000 taxable income, and to tax the one at a progres-
sively higher rate than the other positively violates the other
clause of the Amendment, that all taxes shall be uniform upon
the same class of property."
So much for the classification of property by quantity; it was
judicially held "unreasonable." There was no discussion of
legislative reasonableness, that is, the purposes or policies behind
the legislative decision to subclassify income by quantity. As Jus-
tice Mitchell viewed it, the new uniformity clause required some
intrinsic "natural" difference between the tax classifications
selected; e.g., horses vs. land, or income vs. horses, or land vs.
income. For him, income was one class of property and not sub-
classifiable, at least by amount; this conclusion was mandated
by the existence and language of the uniformity clause. Justice
Steinert, who became the champion of "strict uniformity" in
later opinions, concurred separately to emphasize the compre-
hensiveness of the definition of property in the constitution, and
to reiterate the views of Justice Marshall on classification under
the uniformity clause: the constitution forbids varying the tax
rate based upon the quantity of any given type (land, cattle,
income) of property.70
69. Id. at 382, 25 P.2d at 85.
70. Id. at 384, 25 P.2d at 85.
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Justice Blake, who subsequently championed "liberal uni-
formity," wrote an extensive dissent in Culliton.7' His initial ar-
gument was that the historical context of the legislation required
that it be upheld because it was part of a cohesive legislative plan
which included amendment 14, and also because of the dire fiscal
consequences if the tax were invalidated. He next argued exten-
sively that a tax on income was in reality an excise on the enjoy-
ment of privileges afforded by the state. Justice Blake's strong
dissenting argument that a tax on income is an excise, and the
unsound reasoning underlying the contrary conclusion in
Aberdeen (routinely cited as authority for the position that a tax
on income is a property tax), undoubtedly explain why all subse-
quent statutes explicitly characterized taxes measured by net
income as "privilege" or "excise" taxes.
The contrary argument that the definition of property in
amendment 14 is so broad that it includes income does not di-
rectly address the Blake position that an income tax is in reality
an excise tax. Conceptually, the arguments are fundamentally
different, and the postulation of one does not refute the other.
That is, it is not inconsistent to say that a tax on the privilege of
earning income is an excise tax, and that a tax on the income
produced is a property tax. In attempting to discern the "true"
subject of the tax, one can only arrive at a conclusion through
circular reasoning. Hence, it is as appropriate to "look through"
the stated purpose of taxing the privilege of earning income and
perceive the tax as one on the income itself (per Aberdeen), as it
is to "look through" the procedure of measuring the tax by net
income to perceive the tax as one on the privilege of earning (per
the logic of Justice Blake's Culliton dissent). The futility of con-
ceptually refuting the position that to tax income is to tax prop-
erty is apparent. The better argument is: even if income is prop-
erty, a proper analysis of the legislative classification of property
will sustain the constitutionality of a net income tax. Justice
Blake's final argument was to that effect:7"
Of course citation of cases is not necessary in support of legisla-
tive authority to classify persons in groups for the purposes of
exacting excise taxes from them. The only limitation is that the
classification shall not be unreasonable or arbitrary. And the
courts will not weigh with too much nicety the legislative discre-
tion in that respect. State Board of Tax Commissioners v.
Jackson, 283 U.S. 527 . ...
71. Id. at 384, 25 P.2d at 86.
72. Id. at 389, 25 P.2d at 87.
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While the Amendment placed a limitation of uniformity of
taxation on property in the same class. . . . I fail to see wherein
there is any limitation contained therein to classify property for
purposes of taxation, other than that real estate shall constitute
one class.73
Over the strong and unified dissent, however, the Culliton
court placed its seminally restrictive imprint on the meaning of
the uniformity clause: (1) the clause applies to the taxation of
income as a form of property; (2) the clause imposes a strict
limitation, allowing classification only by generic type of prop-
erty; (3) the clause admits no subclassification of a generic class
by quantity; and (4) the tax rate cannot be progressively in-
creased over a generic class of property.7
The third and fourth rules of classification created by the
court under the auspices of the uniformity clause were explained
in Jensen v. Henneford. 75 There the challenged provision imposed
a normal tax of three percent on net income, less specific credits,76
up to four thousand dollars, and a surtax of four percent on net
income in excess of that amount." The stated object of the tax
was to place an excise on the privilege of receiving income. The
initial reasoning of the Jensen opinion was analogous to that of
Aberdeen and Culliton. Justice Steinert's majority opinion,
joined by three justices, and a separate concurrence by another,
first found that despite the stated subject of the tax, it was not
in fact an excise on a substantive privilege granted by the state,
but rather a tax on the rights to receive and hold income, rights
indicating property ownership. Concluding the tax was, in fact,
73. Id. at 397-98, 25 P.2d at 90.
74. In contrast, the United States Supreme Court approved the use of progressive tax
rates based on increasing levels of net income under the federal income tax laws in
Brushaber v. Union Pac. Ry., 240 U.S. 1, 25 (1916). It may be argued, of course, that any
analogy to federal net income taxation is inappropriate, because the sixteenth amendment
to the United States Constitution specifically authorizes such a tax. Such an argument is
not persuasive, however, because the sixteenth amendment does not mention progressivity
of rates, or even the classification of income in general. Hence, it was left to the courts to
adjudicate the propriety of any classification drawn, whether of the quality of the subject
taxed, or of the taxpayers to be burdened. The criteria used to test the validity of the
federal tax law's classifications were those imposed under the equal protection clause, the
criteria generally applied to test the validity of legislative line-drawing. See Great Atl. &
Pac. Tea Co. v. Grosjeans, 301 U.S. 412 (1937) (sustaining an excise imposed on the
operation of chain stores, with rates progressively increasing with the number of chain
stores under common management).
75. 185 Wash. 209, 53 P.2d 607 (1936).
76. The Washington Legislature has not used the term "credit" in its ordinary tax
sense, as a direct deduction from the tax liability, but as a term denoting deductions
allowed to arrive at net taxable income.
77. 1935 Wash. Laws, ch. 178, at 660-74.
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one on property, the court held it to be controlled by the uniform-
ity clause of amendment 14. The surtax was held violative of
uniformity principles because it created a classification and grad-
uation at the four thousand dollar level (per Culliton). In addi-
tion, the normal tax was held to violate uniformity rules because
the tax rates were applied against "net income in excess of cred-
its," including a one thousand dollar exemption for single persons
and a twenty-five hundred dollar exemption per marital com-
munity. The court held that uniformity rules were violated be-
cause net income, which constituted one class of property under
its interpretations of amendment 14, had been reclassified or
graduated into two distinct classes: single persons' income and
married persons' income.
By adopting this position, the court defined a unique consti-
tutional analysis for income taxation. For the effect of this posi-
tion is to confuse not only the concepts of classification and uni-
formity, but also the concept of exemption with both classifica-
tion and uniformity. The court held that to exempt taxpayers
according to their marital status is to classify income into two
classes, and further, that such a classification violates uniformity
doctrine. Therefore, the court held that the uniformity clause
proscribes exemptions which result in the subclassification of in-
come as a class of property. Yet any exemption necessarily creates
a subclassification of the taxpayers and the subject of the tax;
and the court itself had declared in Atwood 7 that the legislative
power to exempt property from taxation is plenary, per the unam-
biguous language of amendment 14. The court's guiding princi-
ples for and limitations on the legislative power of exemption
otherwise generally have continued to evolve under federal equal
protection and state privileges and immunities concepts. The
taxation of income, however, remains sui generis in that exemp-
tion of any subclass of that particular class of property runs afoul
of the uniformity clause.7
The fourth and final uniformity clause restriction on the
power to classsify was stated in Jensen, where Justice Steinert
78. State ex rel. Atwood v. Wooster, 163 Wash. 659, 2 P.2d 653 (1931). See text
accompanying note 48 supra.
79. The apparently inconsistent position taken by the court in Jensen is even more
questionable; it arises because the legislature fortuitously decided to impose the tax on
net income less credits. If the credits had been applied before erriving at "net income"
(which exists solely as a label for a figure resulting from a series of statutorily prescribed
calculations), the reasoning of Justice Steinert's majority opinion would lead to the con-
clusion that "net income" thus derived, requiring no further statutory adjustments, con-
stitutes a uniform class of property. This reasoning propels form over substance.
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declared: "A tax upon rents from real estate is a tax upon the real
estate itself. Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429
... ' '"0 From this interpretation of Pollock, he reasoned that
because the net income tax statute included rents in the measure
of net income, it imposed a tax on the source of such rents, rented
real estate. And because there was no comparable tax on un-
rented real estate, the statute divided realty into two classes,
income-producing and non-income-producing, in direct violation
of amendment 14's provision that "all real estate shall constitute
one class."
The court either misstated or misinterpreted the Pollock"'
decision, in which the United States Supreme Court held the
initial efforts to enact a federal income tax void. The rationale of
the decision was that rather than being a burden which could be
passed on to third parties by the taxpayer (i.e., an "indirect" tax
such as an excise), the income tax fell directly on the taxpayer
in a manner equivalent to the taxation of property (i.e., a "direct"
tax). Because the federal income tax statute imposed a direct tax,
it was declared void because the tax was not properly apportioned
among the states.8 2 Thus, Pollock dealt solely with the nature of
income taxation as either direct or indirect. Many state courts
misinterpreted the decision, however, as holding that taxation of
income was taxation of property, rather than merely analogous
thereto in the sense of being a direct tax.83
In Jensen the court even ventured beyond the general notion
that a tax on income was a tax on property, to conclude that a
tax on the rents from realty was a tax on that specific realty. Its
position is illogical and indefensible. The court itself had ex-
pressly stated that net income was one class of property. The
state constitution explicitly makes real estate one class of prop-
erty. Realty exists, has value, and is taxed whether rented or not.
If rented, the property continues to exist, unchanged, except that
a new, separate and distinguishable asset is created: the rental
income. The court has stated expressly that net income is a dis-
tinct class of property. The definition or subclassification of in-
come bears no relationship to the taxes imposed upon the class
of real property, which are ad valorem and uniform in their appli-
80. 185 Wash. at 222, 53 P.2d at 612.
81. Pollock v. Farmer's Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895).
82. "No capitation, or other direct, Tax shall be laid, unless in Proportion to the
Census or Enumeration herein before directed to be taken." U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9, cl. 4.
83. See Harsch, State Income Taxation as Affected by Property Tax Limitations, 6
WASH. L. REv. 97, 99 (1931).
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cation. The underlying real estate and the rents produced there-
from are two distinct classes of property; a tax upon income (rent)
and a tax upon real estate are not taxes "upon the same class.","
Shortly after Jensen created the third uniformity rule of clas-
sification, the United States Supreme Court had occasion to con-
sider the reasoning adopted by the Jensen majority. Concluding
that reasoning was unsound, the Court stated: "The theory,
which once won a qualified approval, that a tax on income is
legally or economically a tax on its source, is no longer tenable,
New York ex rel. Cohn v. Graves, 300 U.S. 308, 313, 314 ... "B
Conceptually, the Supreme Court's position supports the better
view that a tax on income is a tax on a distinct class of property,
not resulting in the subclassification of other classes of property.
However, the holding in Jensen persists8 and has potentially per-
vasive effects, for if a tax on rents is a tax on the realty, then
logically any tax on income is a tax on its source, a position which
could create extensive problems under the constitution's immun-
ity and exemption provisions. Additionally, the illogical holding
in Jensen is the only classification rule erected upon the founda-
tion of the uniformity clause that has been held to prohibit classi-
fication in the liberally regulated area of excise taxation. 7
Later cases dealing with efforts to tax income in Washington
add no new concepts to these rules of uniformity. Petroleum Nav-
igation v. Henneford" and Power, Inc. v. Huntley"5 both dealt
with legislative efforts to place an excise, measured by net in-
come, on the privilege of exercising corporate franchises. As in
Aberdeen and Culliton, the excise veil was pierced and the "true"
nature of the tax as one on property was perceived. The cases are
84. If the position in Jensen were carried to its logical extreme, the tax on rents would
be a tax on the real estate, no matter what form the payment of the rents took. That is to
say, if rents were paid in kind, e.g., a machinery manufacturer paying the rent on its
building by providing machinery to the landlord, then logically a tax on those machines
(personalty) would be a tax on the rented building. Or if the rents were paid in cash, to
tax the cash would be to tax the real estate, and even if the cash rent were spent, the cash
rent proceeds would have to be traced to its ultimate form in the lessor's hands (whether
intangibles, tangible personalty, or other realty). Under the Jensen logic, any assets ac-
quired with the cash rent would still be rented income and, therefore, not separately
taxable, because that would create a second class of realty. The absurdity of such a result
is clear.
85. Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466, 480 (1939).
86. 53-55 Op. ATr'y GEN. 320 (1954).
87. Thus, a tax on the activity of renting realty, measured by the gross rent proceeds,
was held to create a second tax on realty in Apartment Operators' Ass'n v. Schumacher,
56 Wash. 2d 46, 351 P.2d 124 (1960).
88. 185 Wash. 495, 55 P.2d 1056 (1936).
89. 39 Wash. 2d 191, 235 P.2d 173 (1951).
[Vol. 1:255
Income Taxation in Washington
noteworthy, however, because they incorporate a part of the
Aberdeen holding into the rules for uniformity. Aberdeen, estab-
lishing a now invalid equal protection rule," held that corpora-
tions could not be treated differently from partnerships and pro-
prietorships unless the tax was truly an excise on the exercise of
the corporate franchise. Petroleum Navigation and Power, Inc.
reached the same result relying upon amendment 14's uniformity
clause, thus transforming an outdated equal protection principle
into an extant uniformity proscription. Since the taxes in both
Petroleum Navigation and Power, Inc. were held to be taxes on
property, they were subject to the uniformity clause, which was
violated when corporations were taxed differently from other
business forms. Neither decision discussed the policy or economic
grounds for legislatively recognizing a difference in the character
of net income earned in the corporate as opposed to the proprie-
tary or partnership capacity.
In summary, the Washington Supreme Court laid down
strict rules governing the classification of property for the pur-
poses of taxation in a series of net income tax decisions beginning
with Culliton v. Chase. Probably the most crucial link in the
evolution of the uniformity clause into a system of rules for classi-
fication was the Culliton determination that property must be
classified by generic type: e.g., land, horses, or income. Once the
class is established upon which taxation must be uniform, then
virtually by the plain meaning of the terms, any further subclassi-
fication of the larger class will result in non-uniformity of taxa-
tion of the larger class. Hence, the remaining specific uniformity
rules of classification flowed naturally, if not necessarily, from
that notion.
Culliton and its progeny are devoid of discussion concerning
the legislative policies to be furthered by the classifications found
impermissible; or of the economic, political, or social differences
between the classes created; or of the relation between the legisla-
tive lines drawn and the legislative ends to be reached. Rather,
the decisions hold income to be property, property to be subject
to the uniformity clause, and certain classifications to be there-
fore impermissible. The only possible interpretation of that logic
is that, for the majority of the Culliton-era court, the clause em-
bodied a distinct set of principles for legislative classification.
Their decisions created a set of strict rules proscribing various
methods of classifying property: (1) property cannot be classified
90. See text accompanying note 61 supra.
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by quantity; (2) property cannot be classified by the nature of the
owner or recipient; (3) property cannot be exempted based on the
status of the owner; and (4) property cannot be classified as the
incidental result of taxing another class of property.
V. THE "OTHER" CLASSIFICATION RULES
A. The Dichotomy
State ex rel. Stiner v. Yelle, in contrast with the companion
Culliton, established the rule that taxes on privileges or activities
(excises) though measured by gross income,"' were not subject to
91. Justice Steinert dissented, vigorously arguing that a tax on gross income was no
different from a tax on net income, that gross income was also a class of property, and a
tax thereon must be uniform, and because the business and occupation tax sustained in
Stiner exempted the activities of farming and of providing professional services, that the
tax was not uniform on the class of gross income. 174 Wash. at 413, 25 P.2d at 95.
Interestingly, Justice Blake relied on essentially the same logic in his last-gasp dissent
in Jensen v. Heneford, 185 Wash. 209, 53 P.2d 607 (1936). He argued that since Culliton,
no less than four decisions ha undermined its holding . Vancouver Oil Co. v, H-enneford,
183 Wash. 317, 49 P.2d 14 (1935); Morrow v. Henneford, 182 Wash. 625, 47 P.2d 1016
(1935); Supply Laundry Co. v. Jenner, 178 Wash. 72, 34 P.2d 363 (1934); State ex rel.
Stiner v. Yelle, 174 Wash. 402, 25 P.2d 91 (1933). Stiner and Supply Laundry both
sustained the state business and occupation tax which, Justice Blake pointed out, was
measured by an unjust measure (gross income) when compared with the net income
(profits) measure. Profits, he opined, more accurately reflect the real amount of benefits
and privileges enjoyed by a business. To approve an excise tax measured by gross income,
he concluded, undermined the holding that an excise on the privilege of receiving income
measured by net income, is not an excise.
Morrow, in turn, sustained the state's retail sales tax. Justice Blake argued in his
Jensen dissent that a sales tax falls on the purchaser and his right to acquire by purchase
an item of tangible personal property. This, he argued, was an even more direct tax on
property than a tax on the inchoate right to receive income; yet it was sustained as an
excise on the activity of selling tangible personal property.
In Vancouver Oil, the court sustained the state compensating use tax; a tax designed
to fill the gap left in the retail sales tax when items were manufactured by the user within
the state, or purchased elsewhere and brought into and used in the state. Justice Blake
argued that the incident of using an item is an even greater index of ownership than a
mere right to receive income, and hence the taxation of use is closer to a tax on the general
incidents of ownership than a tax on income; yet the use tax was sustained as an integral
part of the sales tax. Thus, Justice Blake concluded that these four decisions had under-
mined the Culliton rationale, and that they had demonstrated that a tax on net income
was in reality a tax on the privilege of earning and receiving that income-an excise.
Compare Justice Blake's conclusion with the majority opinion in Jensen, where Jus-
tice Steinert stated that those four preceding decisions were irrelevant to and had not
discussed or even cited Culliton. He further declared: "The right to receive, the reception,
and the right to hold, are progressive incidents of ownership and indispensable thereto.
To tax any one of these elements is to tax their sum total, namely, ownership, and
therefore, the property (income) itself." 185 Wash. at 219, 53 P.2d at 611. Thus, Steinert
identified as indices of property the same indices of ownership taxed as privileges in the
excise tax cases discussed by Blake.
Ironically, Justice Blake's arguments in his Jensen dissent mirrored the positions of
the dissents in each of the cases upholding the excise taxes (business and occupation,
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the uniformity clause, and therewith perpetuated the pre-
amendment 14 dichotomized analysis of property taxes versus
excise taxes. Though the Stiner rule does not derive express sup-
port from the language of amendment 14, it has been consistently
upheld. 2 A strong and analytically sound argument could be
made, however, that the uniformity requirement ("all taxes shall
be uniform on the same class of property") does apply to all taxes.
The logical conclusion would be that each tax levied should be
evaluated to determine initially whether the defined classes of
property were reasonable, and then whether the tax imposed fell
uniformly upon the elements within each class.
The initial postulate of that argument was rejected in Gruen
v. State Tax Commission." Because of the strict classification
sales, and use). His arguments are most noteworthy, however, in that they highlight the
inconsistent and confused reasoning of the income and excise tax cases.
92. Contrary to the rule of Stiner, however, State ex rel. Collier v. Yelle, 9 Wash. 2d
317, 115 P.2d 373 (1941), held that the proceeds of the motor vehicle excise tax could not
be used for the private purpose of reimbursing residents of a street for a street improve-
ments property tax already levied and paid. The court concluded that the second sentence
of amendment 14 ("All taxes shall be uniform upon the same class of property within the
territorial limits of the authority levying the tax and shall be levied and collected for
public purposes only") did in fact apply to all taxes levied in the state. However, it is
semantically absurd to suggest that the first clause applies only to property taxes, while
the second clause applies to all taxes. Curiously, that reasoning was applied in Gruen v.
State Tax Comm'n, 35 Wash. 2d 1, 211 P.2d 651 (1949). See note 93, infra, and accompa-
nying text.
Apartment Operators Ass'n v. Schumacher, 56 Wash. 2d 46, 351 P.2d 124 (1960), is
particularly interesting in this regard. The tax discussed in that case levied a flat rate on
the gross income derived from the activity of leasing property, indices which in prior cases
resulted in the label of an excise tax. However, the tax was invalidated on the basis that
to tax the rents from realty was to tax the realty; and because that created two classes of
realty, rented and unrented, the tax was not uniform on the class of realty, clearly an
imposition of the uniformity clause. The import of this decision is ambiguous, because it
either represents an intrusion of the uniformity clause into excise taxation, a notion the
court had rejected in Gruen; or it represents a holding that gross income derived from an
activity is property and hence subject to the uniformity clause, which is specifically
contrary to Stiner, and in fact represents the position of the dissent in that case.
93. It is true that, in Collier v. Yelle . . . it was stated, in referring to the
gasoline tax and the [state constitution's] fourteenth amendment: "This, of
course, refers to all taxes collected by the state, including property, excise, and
all other taxes. The amendment, then, in scope covers all the state's power to
levy taxes."
This statement, however, was dicta in that the questions before the
[Collier] court. .. made no reference whatever to the proposition above stated.
35 Wash. 2d at 33, 211 P.2d at 670.
The Gruen court held that a tax imposed on the sales, use and consumption of
cigarettes, earmarked for a World War II veterans' bonus fund, was not subject to the
strict uniformity requirements the court had imposed on property taxes. The court con-
cluded that such a tax was governed by the more liberal legislative classification limita-
tions for excise taxes imposed by the federal equal protection and state privileges and
immunities clauses.
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rules it had incorporated into the uniformity clause the court
specifically held that the clause applied only to property taxes.
With its interpretation of the uniformity clause in the income tax
cases, the court had created a monster capable of invalidating
almost any tax held subject to its strict classification principles.
Hence, to validate some of the legislature's efforts to tap new
sources of revenue, the court held that excise taxes were not sub-
ject to the strict uniformity classification rules, despite the lan-
guage of amendment 14. The Gruen decision fueled a continuing
struggle to characterize new taxes (including income taxes) as
excises. The struggle has created a conceptual roadblock obscur-
ing the real analytical dilemma: the dichotomized treatment of
legislative classifications. If amendment 14 is construed properly,
the debate over whether a tax on income is a tax on property or
an excise becomes irrelevant, and the issue of a consistent and
coherent set of principles for legislative line-drawing can be ad-
dressed.
A series of milestone decisions ensued as each of the major
excise taxes was challenged. As noted, State et rel. Stiner v. Yelle
sustained the state's business and occupation tax,94 a tax levied
at varying rates, measured by various forms of gross proceeds,
and imposed upon enumerated commercial activities including
wholesaling, manufacturing, and extracting. The tax was sus-
tained even though the governor had vetoed two sections and
thereby exempted from the tax agricultural activities and profes-
sional services. It was held to be an excise tax, not subject to the
uniformity clause, and thus within the legislature's virtually un-
limited discretion:
A very wide discretion must be conceded to the legislative power
of the state in the classification of trades, callings, businesses or
occupations which may be subjected to special forms of regula-
tion or taxation through an excise or license tax. If the selection
or classification is neither capricious nor arbitrary, and rests
upon some reasonable considerations of difference or policy,
there is no denial of equal protection of the law. 5
Despite this broad language, the Stiner court applied a somewhat
restrictive equal protection analysis in sustaining the tax. Rather
than merely finding some economic difference or policy objective
justifying the classification (exempting farmers and professional
94. 1933 Wash. Laws, ch. 191, at 869.
95. 174 Wash. at 407-08, 25 P.2d at 93 (quoting Brown-Forman Co. v. Kentucky, 217
U.S. 563, 573 (1910)).
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men), the majority went to great lengths to show that farmers and
professional men were not engaged in "commercial activities,"
the object of the tax statute.
The next year Supply Laundry Co. v. Jennere found real
economic differences sufficient to sustain the challenged classifi-
cation. An amendment to the business and occupation tax statute
reinstated professional services as a taxable activity, but ex-
cluded employees or servants from that class.' Supply Laundry
is noteworthy not only for its analysis of the legislative lines
drawn, but also because the court dealt with a double taxation
issue. Under the amended statute, insurance agents were taxed
on their sales activities, measured by gross income (commissions
calculated as a percentage of premiums on policies they had
sold), and insurance companies were taxed on their activity of
selling insurance, measured by gross premiums. The court found
no constitutional infirmity in the double taxation of the prem-
iums, because the business activities of the two separate entities
were distinct. 8
In Morrow v. Henneford, "1 the court sustained the retail sales
tax. The challenge had focused on the argument that the tax was
imposed directly upon property, and that it violated the require-
ments of uniformity. The court argued at great length that the
tax, exacted from the purchaser of tangible personal property was
an excise on the right to acquire property and not a property tax.
In Vancouver Oil Co. v. Henneford,'°° the court sustained the
compensating use tax, relying strictly on Morrow. Neither deci-
sion suggested how either tax would have violated the uniformity
criteria had it been found to be a property tax.10' After finding the
96. 178 Wash. 72, 34 P.2d 363 (1934).
97. 1933 Wash. Laws, Ex. Sess. 157.
98. Compare the strict treatment of double taxation under the uniformity clause,
where separate taxation of two factually independent items, rents from real estate, and
the rent producing real estate, was prohibited under uniformity clause classification rules
because it had the incidental effect of creating, and imposing a second tax upon a subclas-
sification of realty. Jensen v. Henneford, 185 Wash. 209, 53 P.2d 607 (1936). See text
accompanying note 80, supra.
99. 182 Wash. 625, 47 P.2d 1016 (1935).
100. 183 Wash. 317, 49 P.2d 14 (1935).
101. The difficulty in framing the uniformity violation in these excise tax cases is
that, even if the tax were found to be a property tax, there would logically be no violation
of uniformity principles. The respective classes of property taxed (loosely defined) would
be "property purchased at retail" and "property manufactured or brought into and used
in the state, and not previously subjected to sales taxation." Upon those classes of prop-
erty, the flat-rate tax is uniform, even under strict uniformity rules. The potential uni-
formity issue might be that if such property were subject to an ad valorem personal
property tax, there would be double taxation of the property with no corresponding tax
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use tax not subject to the uniformity clause, the court, quoting
the United States Supreme Court, stated:
[Tihe power of the state to classify for purposes of taxation is
of wide range and flexibility, provided that the classification
rests upon a substantial difference so that all persons similarly
circumstanced will be treated alike. Statutes which tax one
class of property while exempting another class necessarily re-
sult in imposing a greater burden upon the property taxed than
would be the case if the omitted property were included. But
such statutes do not create an inequality in the constitutional
sense. 102
The quoted passage is particularly significant because it demon-
strates that the United States Supreme Court, unlike the Wash-
ington Supreme Court, does not distinguish between property
taxes and excise taxes in applying equal protection criteria.
B. The Current Rules-Broad Discretion
Washington case law demonstrating the broad legislative
discretion to classify the subjects of excise taxation in a wide
variety of classification issues and methods is legion. 10 3 The rules
limiting that discretion have been judicially developed under fed-
eral equal protection and state privileges and immunities princi-
ples. Two cases are particularly important to a discussion of the
criteria for evaluating the legislative discretion to classify for tax
on property not purchased at retail. That can be refuted, however, because the sales tax
would be imposed only once, at the instant of sale, prior to any acts of dominion or
ownership; and not in addition to an ad valorem property tax, which would fall due only
at the close of subsequent assessment periods, based on the exercise of the incidents of
ownership.
102. 183 Wash. at 320-21, 49 P.2d at 16 (quoting Hart Refineries v. Harmon, 278 U.S.
499, 502 (1929)).
103. Sonitrol Northwest, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 84 Wash. 2d 588, 528 P.2d 474 (1974)
(municipal excise singling out burglar alarm system operator); Commonwealth Title Ins.
Co. v. City of Tacoma, 81 Wash. 2d 391, 502 P.2d 1024 (1972) (municipal ordinances
taxing title insurance companies as retail businesses for sales and use taxes and as service
companies for business and occupation taxes); H & B Communications v. City of Rich-
land, 79 Wash. 2d 312, 484 P.2d 1141 (1971) (municipal business and occupation tax on
cable television in a separate class where only one existed in the city); State ex rel. Namer
Inv. Corp. v. Williams, 73 Wash. 2d 1, 435 P.2d 975 (1968) (classification of lease options
as a taxable real estate transaction); Black v. State, 67 Wash. 2d 97, 406 P.2d 761 (1965)
(tax on lease of ship as hotel); Hemphill v. Tax Comm'n, 65 Wash. 2d 889, 400 P.2d 297,
appeal dismissed, 383 U.S. 103 (1965) (bowling singled out for exclusion from admission
tax); Bates v. McLeon, 11 Wash. 2d 648, 120 P.2d 472 (1942) (state unemployment com-
pensation contribution taxes); Texas Co. v. Cohn, 8 Wash. 2d 360, 112 P.2d 522 (1941)
(excise on fuel oil handlers, none on competing solid fuel handlers).
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purposes: Sonitrol Northwest, Inc. v. City of Seattle°4 and Texas
Co. v. Cohn. 5
In Sonitrol the court sustained a municipal excise tax on a
burglar alarm system company of seven percent of its total gross
income. Companies providing local alarms or foot patrols, how-
ever, were taxed at only one-tenth of one percent of gross income.
The court found that the functional differences between the two
classes of burglar alarm companies justified the legislative deci-
sion to tax one at seventy (70) times the rate applied to the other.
Sonitrol is invaluable because it provides a complete guideN for
analyzing excise tax classification issues:
(1) "Legislative bodies have very extensive powers to make
classifications for purposes of legislation.' '0
(2) To comply with the equal protection provision found in
Const. Art. 1, Sec. 12, a classification must meet and satisfy
three requirements.
[(a)] First, legislation must apply alike to all persons
within a designated class.
[(b)] Second, there must be reasonable grounds for mak-
ing distinctions between those who fall within the class
and those who do not.
104. 84 Wash. 2d 588, 528 P.2d 474 (1974).
105. 8 Wash. 2d 360, 112 P.2d 522 (1941).
106. The Washington cases cited in Sonitrol all draw upon Supreme Court decisions
which provide the fabric of equal protection analysis. Some of the most frequently cited
passages include:
It is not the function of this court ... to consider the propriety or justness
of the tax .... Our duty is to sustain the classifications adopted by the legisla-
ture if there are substantial differences between the occupations separately
classified. Such differences need not be great.
State Bd. of Tax Comm'rs of Ind. v. Jackson, 283 U.S. 527, 537-38 (1930).
It is inherent in the exercise of the power to tax that a state be free to select
the subjects of taxation and to grant exemptions .... A legislature is not bound
to tax every member of a class or none. It may make distinctions of degree
having a rational basis if there is any conceivable state of facts which would
support it.
Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495, 509 (1937).
Of course, the States, in the exercise of their taxing power, are subject to the
requirements of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
But that clause imposes no iron rule of equality, prohibiting the flexibility and
variety that are appropriate to reasonable schemes of state taxation .... To
hold otherwise would be to subject the essential taxing power of the state to an
intolerable supervision, hostile to the basic principles of our Government and
wholly beyond the protection which the general clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment was intended to assure . ...
Allied Stores of Ohio v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 526-28 (1958).
107. 84 Wash. 2d at 590, 528 P.2d at 476.
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[(c)] Third, the disparity in treatment must be germane
to the object of the law in which it appears."''08
(3) "The test for the purposes of classification is merely whether
"any state of facts reasonably can be conceived that would sus-
tain the classification." Allied Stores v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522
''109
(4) "The legislature has even broader discretion and greater
power in making classifications for taxation than it has for
regulation." 110
(5) "The fact that the higher tax on [the taxpayer's] business
may put him at a competitive disadvantage is of no moment."'
Texas Co. v. Cohen, which reversed State v. Inland Empire
Refineries,"2 is important not only as the consolidation and
source of much of the doctrine restated in Sonitrol, but also as a
particularly appropriate example of the court's willingness to re-
consider and correct or modify prior holdings on tax issues. Inland
Empire had held a 1939 fuel oil tax on distributors invalid be-
cause solid fuel distributors were not similarly taxed. Citin
Quaker City Cab Co. v. Pennsylvania,"13 the court found that
distributors of fuel, solid or oil, were in one competitive class, and
that there were no reasonable grounds to distinguish between
them; therefore, the divisive classification was arbitrary. In the
Texas Co. decision, the court re-examined Inland Empire and,
after a detailed and exhaustive discussion of United States Su-
108. Id. at 589-90, 528 P.2d at 476.
109. Id. at 590, 528 P.2d at 476.
110. Id. at 591, 528 P.2d at 477.
The familiar rule that legislative classification, in order to come within
constitutional limitations, must bear some reasonable relation to the object of
the law in which it appears, originated in cases construing regulatory laws,
where it has a natural and logical application. A statute prescribing a regulation
in the exercise of the police power has a definite object which concerns the public
health, safety, morals, or the like. If such a statute is not universal in its applica-
tion, but applies only to a particular class, then, in order to satisfy constitutional
requirements, the regulation of those within the class, as distinguished from
those excluded therefrom, must tend to accomplish the object of the statute.
When the rule is applied to a tax law, however, it should be done with due
appreciation of the fact that usually the principal object of such a law, and very
often the sole object, is to raise revenue for the support of the taxing government.
Thus the state may constitutionally tax one class and exempt other classes, if
the classification reasonably tends, in some lawful way, to facilitate the raising
of revenue.
Id. at 592, 528 P.2d at 477 (quoting Texas Co. v. Cohn, 8 Wash. 2d 360, 376, 112 P.2d
522, 529-30 (1941)).
111. Id. at 593, 528 P.2d at 478.
112. 3 Wash. 2d 651, 101 P.2d 975 (1940).
113. 277 U.S. 389 (1928).
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preme Court and prior Washington Supreme Court equal protec-
tion decisions, reversed its holding, rejected its conclusory state-
ment that such a classification was unreasonable per se, found
factual and policy bases for differentiating between distributors
of fuel oil and solid fuel, and sustained the tax.
C. Exemption of Property
The power to exempt property from tax is an apparent incon-
sistency in the requirement of uniformity receiving both constitu-
tional and judical approval. Amendment 14 provides in part: "All
taxes shall be uniform on the same class of property . . . . All
real estate shall constitute one class . . . . Such property as the
legislature may by general law provide shall be exempt from tax-
ation." (emphasis added). Beginning with State ex rel. Atwood
v. Wooster,"' the Washington Supreme Court has held the power
to exempt to be plenary and complete in itself, subject only to
equal protection limitations.
Recent decisions concerning real property such as Pacific
Northwest Annual Conference of the United Methodist Church v.
Walla Walla County"5 (exemption of parsonages) and Yakima
First Baptist Homes v. Gray' (exemption of certain homes for
the aged and infirm) reaffirm the broad power of the legislature
to classify property for exemption. In Snow's Mobile Homes, Inc.
v. Morgan, II dealers' inventories were exempted from an ad valo-
rem tax otherwise imposed on mobile homes. Some dealers had
listed their mobile home inventories on the tax roles prior to the
effective date of the exemption and were assessed for property
taxes. The court never questioned the propriety of exempting a
particular class of mobile homes from property taxation. Instead,
it invoked the uniformity clause to find that the exemption oper-
ated retroactively to eliminate the arbitrary incidental subclassi-
fication of dealers into two groups, those fortuitously listing their
mobile homes for taxation and those not, concluding no dealers
need pay the ad valorem taxes on their inventory. Finally, Libby,
McNeill & Libby v. Ivarson,18 citing the substantial changes in
the law of exemption fostered by amendment 14, sustained a
narrow class exemption from personal property taxes for fish and
fish products fit for human consumption stored in the state and
114. 163 Wash. 659, 2 P.2d 653 (1931).
115. 82 Wash. 2d 138, 508 P.2d 1361 (1973).
116. 82 Wash. 2d 295, 510 P.2d 243 (1973).
117. 80 Wash. 2d 283, 494 P.2d 216 (1972).
118. 19 Wash. 2d 723, 144 P.2d 258 (1943).
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shipped out of the state on or before April thirtieth.
The cited cases demonstrate the court's approval of legisla-
tive decisions exempting various classes of property from taxation
for a variety of legislative reasons: fiscal policy (to foster the
storage of fish products in the state); the commercial status of the
property owner (the mobile home dealers vs. users); and extrinsic
criteria unrelated to the nature of the property (shipment out of
state prior to assessment day). In United Methodist Church and
Yakima First Baptist Homes, real estate was exempted; real es-
tate which is constitutionally mandated to constitute one class.
By contrast, the court had held, even in the absence of an analo-
gous express constitutional mandate declaring net income one
class, that considerations such as policy grounds (ability to pay),
the commercial or social status of the owner (corporations vs.
partnerships; married vs. single), and criteria unrelated to the
nature of the property (quantity) are impermissible bases for ex-
empting sub-classes of net income. In so holding, the court has
never discussed the rationali legilative deciniunn p
net income on those bases.
VI. CONCLUSION
As a result of the divergent paths taken in the net income tax
cases and the excise tax cases, the Washington Supreme Court
has created two sets of rules for classifying the various subjects
of state tax laws: the classification of property is subject to the
uniformity clause of the state constitution; the classification of all
other subjects is governed by the privileges and immunities
clause."9 The time is now at hand for the court to reexamine its
position on the relationship of uniformity and classification, espe-
cially since the United States Supreme Court decisions which
provided the logical underpinnings of several of the restrictive
uniformity classification requirements have been overruled, lim-
ited to their special facts, or reinterpreted to be inconsistent with
119. The anachronistic and stagnant nature of that analysis compels Washington
legislators to characterize most revenue proposals as excises. Those uniformity principles
of classification which could be justified by analogy to equal protection doctrine current
when the uniformity concepts were developing would now be invalid as principles of equal
protection. See text accompanying note 64 supra. The uniformity principles of classifica-
tion, however, have not been modified since the income tax cases, primarily because of
the court's success in characterizing virtually all other new taxes as excises. As a result,
each fresh attack on a new tax helped refine, modernize, and, in fact, liberalize the
taxation analysis under the equal protection clause. Each new opinion resolving the valid-
ity of an excise tax brought equal protection criteria into sharper resolution, while the
classification rules of the uniformity clause remained restrictive and unchanging.
[Vol. 1:255
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the Washington court's interpretations.
The analytical approach that the court should adopt for all
tax measures is two-tiered:
First, test the legislative classifications according to the most
current federal equal protection and state privileges and immuni-
ties criteria;
Second, determine whether the tax imposed falls uniformly
upon each legislatively created class of property subject to the
tax.
It may be argued that the court's uniformity doctrine is now
so integrally a part of amendment 14 that the court should not,
on grounds of stare decisis, reconsider Culliton v. Chase and its
progeny. But surely no rule of law is entitled to continued support
unless grounded in persuasive analysis or sound underlying prin-
ciples. The court has previously reversed its own interpretation
of the state constitution in the area of taxation and revenue. In
an eloquent and expansive unanimous decision in State ex rel.
Finance Commission v. Martin, 12 0 Justice Hale stated:
Time is both enemy and friend to a good idea. Thoughts held
clearly in the beginning may obscure and lose their outline as
the present merges with the future and becomes the past again.
Conversely, concepts vague in their beginnings may sharpen in
form and shape by the passing of years and the force of events.
So it is and was with Gruen v. State Tax Comm., 35 Wn.2d 1,
211 P.2d 651. Rising sharply in bold relief from the mists of state
financing, this case declared a brave new doctrine in 1949; 14
years later the march of time and events has left us wondering.'",
The court decided Martin in 1963, overruling Gruen's definition
of state debt under article 8, sections 1 & 3, of the state constitu-
tion. Justice Hale accepted without hesitation the notion that an
erroneous interpretation of the constitution could be corrected,
and in an extensive discussion justifying the prospective applica-
tion of the court's new interpretation stated:
To be uniformly applied, and equally administered, the
rules of law should be both just and adaptable to the society
they govern. A bad law uniformly administered is equally unjust
and uniformly bad. If a rule laid down by the courts proves in
time to be a bad one, applying the bad rule evenly does not
provide equal justice for all. It may be equal, but it will not be
justice. And courts are instituted among.men to do justice be-
120. 52 Wash. 2d 645, 384 P.2d 833 (1963) (two justices specially concurring).
121. Id. at 646, 384 P.2d at 834.
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tween them, and between men and their government. So, to do
justice, courts have devised a means of getting rid of bad rules,
yet, at the same time, preserving stare decisis. Rules of law, like
governments, should not be changed for light or transient
causes; but, when time and events prove the need for a change,
changed they must be.
If rights have vested under a faulty rule, or a constitution
misinterpreted, or a statute misconstrued, or where, as here,
subsequent events demonstrate a ruling to be, in error, prospec-
tive overruling becomes a logical and integral part of stare de-
cisis by enabling the courts to right a wrong without doing more
injustice than is sought to be corrected.'
It can be argued that Martin is distinguishable in that it did
not overrule a holding as venerable and oft cited as Culliton and
its progeny. That argument is specious, however, because even
though the court had not extensively relied on the precise holding
in Gruen which they overruled in Martin,'23 the legislature had
done so steadfastly. In fact, when Martin was decided over 350
million dollars in bonds issued in reliance on Gruen were out-
standing 24 and depended for their validity on that decision;
hence, the strong incentive for the court to overrule Gruen pro-
spectively. In contrast, Culliton has been relied upon not to
enable legislation, but to prevent it. Correcting the erroneous
holding in Culliton will prejudice no existing rights or duties and
cannot have retrospective effect, as a net income tax will require
new legislation.
The only possible persuasive reason for not adopting our sug-
gested analysis is some reasoned explanation for the court's con-
tinued dichotomized treatment of property and excise taxation in
the face of the history and language of amendment 14. None is
explicitly stated in the court's opinions, but there are several
possible explanations.
First, the court may simply have carried into amendment 14
the old criteria of uniformity and equality from the original con-
stitution and their mandatory application to all property. Justice
Mitchell stated in his concurring opinion in Culliton v. Chase:
"This principle of uniformity in taxation has been preserved at
all times in our constitution, as appears from article VII, §2, of
the constitution, and from the fourteenth amendment. ' '25 The
122. Id. at 665-66, 384 P.2d at 845 (emphasis added).
123. Id. at 662-63, 384 P.2d at 843.
124. Id. at 650-51, 384 P.2d at 837.
125. 174 Wash. at 382, 25 P.2d at 85.
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original constitutional provisions, as discussed earlier applied
only to property taxation, probably because the framers had not
considered other sources of revenue. Thus, it was essential to
distinguish capitation and inheritance taxes, which the court val-
idated, from property taxes because those original provisions
mandated that property taxes be uniform and equal on all prop-
erty. There were no express constituional guidelines for taxes lev-
ied on other subjects such as activities or privileges.
Justice Mitchell's statement relating uniformity under the
original constitution to the uniformity clause was not a reasoned
conclusion. As we have demonstrated, amendment 14 dramati-
cally changed the old constitutional tax provisions and, by its
express language, applied to "all taxes" and permitted the classi-
fication of property. That amendment did not simply carry for-
ward the old dichotomy between property taxes and all other
taxes; the significance and meaning of its language was-and
is-deserving of a more detailed analysis.
Second, the court may have been influenced by the very
existence of a clause requiring uniformity of taxation only upon
classes of property, and may have interpreted the existence of
such a clause to indicate that the classification of property was
to be treated differently. Or the court may have somehow con-
strued the phrase "all taxes shall be uniform upon the same class
of property" to subordinate the issue of classification to the issue
of uniformity; or attached some special significance to the con-
cept of the "same class." Those notions would explain its refusal
to allow subclassification of generic types of property such as net
income. Neither of those constructions is suggested by the lan-
guage of the clause nor the various opinions. The issues of uni-
formity and classification are distinct. The word "uniform" refers
to the taxes imposed, while the word "class" requires a determi-
nation of whether the legislative distinctions result in reasonable
classifications of property.
One can argue that if the issue of uniformity is subordinated
to or analyzed only after an analysis of the propriety of legislative
classifications, uniformity will be a dead letter if the legislature
can create sufficiently precise classes. That argument fails for two
reasons: first, any classifications of property or otherwise must
satisfy equal protection criteria; and second, amendment 14 man-
dates that real estate remain one class of property, thereby re-
taining the full vitality of uniformity principles in that area of
taxation. The very fact that the framers of amendment 14 explic-
itly characterized real estate as a single class suggests they sought
19781
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to limit the legislature's power to classify only with respect to this
one generic type of property.
Finally, the majority of the court may simply have substi-
tuted their personal judgments and philosophies for those of the
legislature in their evaluation of the income tax laws, as the fol-
lowing quotes suggest:
Justice Holcomb in Culliton v. Chase:
It needs no argument to demonstrate that the income taxes here
levied are wholly lacking in uniformity.2 '
Justice Mitchell in Culliton:
It might be reasonable, under the amendment, to provide that,
for taxation purposes, horses be put in a class and bear a rate
of taxation different from that of lands devoted to reforestration;
but not so with a band of one thousand horses compared with
another band of two thousand horses . . . .
Justice Steinert dissenting in State ex rel. Stiner v. Yelle:
As it now stands, the act presents a classifilation t ... i unre
sonable and arbitrary, discriminatory in its nature, and taking
no thought of relative ability to pay, or the relative enjoyment
of governmental privileges conferred.... I do not believe that
either the farmer or the professional man should be exempt from
the occupation tax, and certainly not the landlord, the
mortgage-loan company, or even the salaried person.
28
Articulating his concept of the court's power to review legislative
acts, Justice Steinert in his vigorous dissent from the permissive
interpretation of amendment 14 in State ex rel. Mason County
Logging Co. v. Wiley:
It is not the legislative function to interpret the constitu-
tion, and certainly the legislature cannot, by passing a statute,
thereby declare or determine that it is constitutional; nor can it
say that the constitution is to be interpreted according to what
the legislature meant in a particular legislative act. The legisla-
ture may express its own intent, but whether its act embodying
that intent meets the requirements of the constitution, is wholly
a judicial question and rests with the courts only.
The constitution is not so elastic or so anemic that it must
bend or bow to the will or direction of the legislature. The consti-
tution is the fundamental law of the land, absolute, permanent
126. Id. at 378, 25 P.2d at 83.
127. Id. at 382, 25 P.2d at 85.
128. 174 Wash. at 422-23, 25 P.2d at 98.
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and unalterable, except by the authority from which it ema-
nates. It has a stability intended to protect against fluctuations
of popular opinion or of legislative action. "'
In context, Justice Steinert's comments demonstrate even
more dramatically that he viewed the court's perception of the
constitution, rather than the constitution itself, as sacrosanct. To
emphasize and clarify the effect of Justice Steinert's views, we
juxtapose the comments of the Wiley majority concerning the
court's role in reviewing the legislative function:
The act before us is the well-considered and deliberate result of
the consideration given to the problem by the legislature. It
comes before us with every intendment in its favor, and nothing
less than a certain and unequivocal violation of some constitu-
tional inhibition can warrant us in holding it inoperative.' 31
And a recent statement by the court evincing judicial deference
to the legislative function:
We are not a super legislature. "This Court neither approves nor
condemns any legislative policy. Its delicate and difficult office
is to ascertain and declare whether legislation is in accordance
with, or in contravention of, the provisions of the Constitution;
and, having done that, its duty ends."' 3'
None of these possible explanations for the court's attempt
to distinguish rules of classification for property taxes from rules
for excise taxes has a rational basis in the state's constitution. No
other explanation is apparent; property possesses no obvious
unique trait which would explain its variant treatment. There-
fore, the Washington Supreme Court should abandon the prop-
erty versus excise dichotomy, and apply one consistent and coher-
ent set of classification principles in analyzing all taxes.
129. 177 Wash. 65, 76-77, 31 P.2d 539, 544 (1934).
130. Id. at 71, 31 P.2d at 542.
131. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Washington Life & Disability Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 83 Wash.
2d 523, 528, 520 P.2d 162, 166 (1974) (quoting United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 63
(1936)).
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